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Abstract 
Much public health research considers interventions that influence and are influenced by both 
individuals’ health and the society around them; this can be described as a complex system. We 
consider the role of explanation alongside statistical inference as crucial to obtaining credible and 
useful insights, particularly in light of concerns about a 'crisis of replication’, and reflect on the 
difficulty in researching complex systems. In this paper, we make a connection with Lipton's 
philosophy of inference to the best explanation, and offer some tentative practical 
recommendations, extending suggestions from different fields. An extended hypothetical example 
is given on introducing ‘sugar tax' in England. 
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Introduction 
 
Complex systems 
This paper will explore the implications of complexity for the relationship between research 
and policy in the English public health sector. Our focus is on the interface between scientific 
explanation and policy prescription, drawing on the hypothetical example of a sugar tax policy as 
well as recent debates about statistical significance and the crisis of replication in research 
findings. To begin, we outline why theories of complex systems are relevant in policy and research. 
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A key feature of a complex system is the involvement of intelligent agents, whose behaviour 
adapts in response to interventions, and also potentially to being observed by a researcher 
(Cilliers, 2005). These will typically be policy-makers, managers, professionals and service users, 
but increasingly may also be machine learning / artificial intelligence programs that monitor and 
respond to data. Complex systems are characterised by a high degree of interconnectedness 
between agents and their social practices (Byrne, 1998; Harvey & Reed, 1996; Hood, 2014; 
Stacey, 2007). New global patterns of behaviour emerge from local interactions in a way that is 
sensitive to but not predictable from the recent past, so it is dynamic (the rules of interaction can 
change) and non-linear (a small input can cause a large change) (Byrne, 1998; Sayer, 1992). 
In the field of healthcare, these ideas have gained increasing prominence in the evaluation of 
what have been termed ‘complex interventions’ (Greenwood-Lee, Hawe, Nettel-Aguirre, Shiell, & 
Marshall, 2016, Moore et al., 2015; Campbell et al., 2007; Craig et al., 2008). According to the 
Medical Research Council (MRC)’s guidance on evaluating complex interventions (Craig et al., 
2008), complex interventions are characterised by: 
 Many interacting components within the intervention  
 Requirement for those delivering or receiving the intervention to behave in a range of 
different ways 
 Targeting of multiple groups or organisational levels 
 Number and variability of outcomes 
 Need for a degree of flexibility or tailoring 
These features require an understanding of causal processes as well as outcomes, and 
acknowledge that complex interventions may work best if tailored to local circumstances. The 
guidance also noted the problem of replication, evidence synthesis, and wider implementation, 
suggesting that detailed descriptions of interventions might help to transfer them to different 
settings.  
The MRC guidance has been influential and helpful in generating structured approaches to 
evaluating complex healthcare interventions, for example, Wight, Wimbush, Jepson, and Doi 
(2016). They have the virtue of establishing a theory of causal processes – i.e. how the 
intervention works – alongside the testing of outcomes through various forms of (preferably 
experimental) research designs, which has previously been lacking (Lewin, Glenton, & Oxman, 
2009). What is perhaps less evident in this literature is a critique of the statistical models used to 
generate findings and how these findings are then interpreted by the wider healthcare and policy 
community. We believe such a critique is necessary because, in a complex system, standard 
statistical approaches will interpret the dynamics and non-linearity as unexplained variation, which 
appears to grow as more data are collected and the dynamics of the system take effect.  
 
Typically, a statistical model will use all the available data to calculate the point estimate as 
well as the unexplained variation around this point. The model relies on nothing unexpected 
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happening to disrupt the estimate, and variation is assumed to be independent of the data and is 
simply seen as ‘noise’ rather than being of intrinsic interest. These assumptions can prove 
misleading when they ignore contextual factors.  .The appearance of clear and compelling 
inferences can be achieved by reducing the data in terms of location, timescale or perspectives, for 
example by pooling data from different localities before and after a national intervention. 
Unfortunately, complex system dynamics mean that such clear findings are unlikely to persist, , 
and so the predicted effect of any intervention designed around them will fail to materialise. Manski 
called this problem ‘incredible certitude’ (Manski, 2013). Alternatively, strong assumptions can be 
imposed on the data, simplifying the analysis even if the data are not reduced.  
 
Inference to the best explanation 
‘Inference to the best explanation’ is a philosophical theory of how we make inductive 
inferences that emphasises the importance of explanation alongside (and distinct from) statistical 
inference (Lipton, 2004). Statistical inference aims to make statements about the population based 
on a sample, while explanation in this sense is a convincing account of causation that can aid 
predictions of future behaviour. Explanation is generally formed by researchers thinking about the 
results and is not determined objectively by the inference. Much of our notion of good practice as 
scientists comes from the hypothetico-deductive model from the physical sciences and 
experimental medical research, where a statistical inference from sample to population can 
reasonably be expected to reveal a pattern that will persist over time and settings. In such fields, 
the explanation is relatively unimportant but in complex systems it becomes more important than 
the statistical inference. 
In recent years, much has been written about a ‘crisis of replication’: statistically significant 
patterns disappear when efforts are made to replicate the study (Baker, 2016). Often, this indicates 
being led by the data to the strongest signal and then regarding that as if it was a pre-specified, 
isolated, precise hypothesis. The most obvious form of this is running multiple statistical tests on 
the same data without appropriate adjustment, which is called ‘p-hacking’, ‘data dredging’ or 
‘fishing’. This is often done without malice but through a lack of awareness. It also happens where 
broad ‘scientific’ or ‘substantive’ hypotheses permit many statistical hypotheses. To take an actual 
example, researchers considered whether a woman’s choice of clothing on a particular day was in 
some way linked to menstrual cycle (a broad substantive hypothesis), and presented a statistically 
significant difference in the proportion of pink or red shirts and tops in the 5 days around expected 
ovulation (a precise statistical hypothesis, one of many) (Gelman & Loken, 2013). This is a 
manifestation of the inference/explanation divide, as a statistical test for one explanatory model 
does not distinguish it from other competing models (Mayo & Cox, 2006). Platt’s recommendation 
for ‘strong inference’ involved an inductive iterative process, with each iteration containing a 
deductive experiment testing a hypothesis, and he argued against drawing conclusions from one 
test (Platt, 1964). Without a potential explanation, one cannot define a precise hypothesis, and 
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may select the most interesting pattern without coming under suspicion of multiple testing; indeed, 
only one statistical test might be conducted, or none at all. This problem has been called 
‘researcher degrees of freedom’ or ‘the garden of forking paths’ (Gelman & Loken, 2013). We 
prefer to emphasise the parallel with multiple testing by calling them overt multiplicity and cryptic 
multiplicity (see also Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011)).  
Over-simplified analyses in complex systems have been subject to numerous criticisms over 
the years. By attempting to reduce complexity to a set of technical challenges, the social quasi-
experiment takes place in an illusory world of control and predictability that may be reassuring but 
ultimately misleads policy makers (Hood, 2014). More recent approaches to evaluation have 
therefore highlighted the importance of programme theory (Pawson, 2013; Donaldson, 2007). 
Despite this attention, it is not at all clear how studies should best report their definitions and use of 
complexity (Thompson, Fazio, Kustra, Patrick, & Stanley, 2016). Pre-specified analysis plans have 
been crucial in improving the conduct of clinical trials, but when applied to complex systems do not 
provide details of analytical simplifications, so there is considerable scope for overt and cryptic 
multiplicity. 
 
The near future 
Readers are invited to consider a hypothetical scenario:  
‘The British government is under pressure from business lobbyists to 
step back from the promised implementation of a ‘sugar tax’ on the sale of 
soft drinks. The new Minister for Health announces that the policy will be 
phased in across different regions “to allow an independent and scientific 
evaluation”.  She tells reporters that “We are absolutely committed to doing 
the right thing, and doing it in the right way. Our policies are based on 
scientific evidence rather than opinion and hearsay. So if the science says 
there are no benefits to public health, we will stop, and if it says the tax 
delivers what it is supposed to, we will go ahead.” A large sum of money is 
fast-tracked to a group of public health researchers and they set about 
planning the work.  
‘The researchers negotiate a ‘natural experiment’, in which the tax is 
imposed in some jurisdictions and not in others, with similar demographic 
characteristics in each population. Desired outcomes include sales of sugary 
drinks and foods, as well as health outcomes such as rates of childhood 
obesity and glycaemic control in people with diabetes. While the government 
wants results delivered within one year, the researchers do not believe this is 
long enough to measure the effect. A compromise is reached, with interim 
outcomes (obesity rates from school nurses) reported at one year and limited 
funding provided for a three-year follow up using inexpensive data from 
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existing national health surveys and voluntarily contributed data from 
supermarkets.  
‘The research attracts attention in the media, not all of it positive. 
Advocates of the tax complain that evaluation is causing unnecessary delay 
that will ‘cost lives’, while opponents argue that it is ‘nanny state’ 
interference, a waste of time and money, and ethically unsound. Meanwhile, 
it turns out that only one supermarket chain is willing to release sales data, 
which will affect the validity of longer-term outcome measures.  
‘After one year, the interim report is sent confidentially to the 
Department of Health. They do not publish it in full but rather a simple 
summary showing a statistically significant reduction in obesity rates. Soon it 
is announced that the sugar tax will therefore be implemented nationwide. 
‘Concerns and caveats emerge later, but get little media coverage. The 
supermarket data is even more limited than expected, and shows no 
significant change in sales. The supermarket’s chief executive retired 
towards the end of the ‘natural experiment’ and gave interviews making it 
clear that he viewed opening up their data as a legacy of his career, “giving 
something back for the next generation”. Other members of the board were 
less keen and so, on his departure, the scope of the data was greatly 
curtailed and interviews arranged with staff members were cancelled, for fear 
of adverse publicity. Anecdotally, the researchers learn that store managers, 
reticent to have falling sales visible to their management, ran promotions and 
placed drinks more visibly within the stores to counteract it. Meanwhile, local 
government inspectors, charged with policing the imposition of the tax on 
imported drinks, had no additional funding for this, despite stories emerging 
of independent shops and online traders selling bulk drinks tax-free from 
other regions. 
‘The school nurse data on obesity rates also had caveats. Although a 
significant reduction was observed, there were many competing 
explanations: 
  the tax led parents to switch to healthier alternatives when shopping 
 the publicity surrounding this controversial initiative, not the tax, was 
responsible for parents adopting healthier diets 
 public health professionals saw the sugar tax pilot as an opportunity to 
run publicity campaigns around healthy lifestyles, and these were 
responsible 
 the economy was improving at the time and parents were coincidentally 
able to afford healthier diets 
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 regression to the mean: the region was chosen because the previous 
year’s obesity statistics were poor, and this happened to be a natural 
fluctuation which corrected itself the following year 
 school nurses actively campaigned for the pilot to come to their region 
by weighing more children who might be around the threshold for 
obesity, and this campaign ended when the tax was imposed (and 
perhaps some unconscious bias came into weighing in the following 
year; they want and expect to see their efforts leading to healthier 
children) 
 parents who felt unfairly victimised by the tax and the surrounding 
publicity did not cooperate with the visiting school nurses, and their 
children were more likely to be obese 
 the change reflects a long-term trend toward healthier lifestyles 
nationally, not any effect of the tax itself.  
Some of these problems would be resolved in an ideal world with plenty of data and a 
sophisticated analysis, but even the ideal hypothetico-deductive study will not help to choose an 
explanation. This story is designed as a critique of the way in which research comes to provide 
evidence for policy implementation in public health.  Although fictional, it is hardly far-fetched: at 
the time of writing, a tax on drinks with high added sugar levels is indeed proposed for 
implementation in England in 2018, and a Mexican study is one of the key pieces of evidence 
adduced in support of the policy (Colchero, Popkin, Rivera, & Ng, 2016). There are reasons to be 
sceptical of the government’s claim to be basing policy on scientific evidence. In the run-up to the 
policy’s official announcement in 2016, the Chief Medical Officer for England, Dame Sally Davies, 
asserted in a radio interview that “we know it works because there is rigorous evidence from 
Mexico” [our emphasis] (BBC, 2015). This leaves no doubt that the Mexican findings are not only 
generalizable to an entirely different country and healthcare system, but constitute ‘knowledge’, 
which brings it into the realm of Manski’s ‘incredible certitude’. 
Colchero and colleagues report one year after implementation of the tax in Mexico (Colchero 
et al., 2016). Their evaluation contrasts observed beverage sales with a projection based on two 
years of data prior to the tax. The study appears to have been conducted to a high standard, and 
the paper does not make unsupported claims, though two major limitations are appropriately 
highlighted by the authors. First, two years is insufficient data to model a complex phenomenon 
influenced by a large range of factors. Second, it is not known to what extent sugar consumption 
as a whole has changed. Like our hypothetical researchers in the UK, they relied on extant data 
sources (a survey of household food and drink in urban areas) for their outcomes. It is possible 
that people would have reduced consumption anyway, that they are consuming more homemade 
agua fresca (sweetened fruit infusions popular in Mexico), or that they have taken to eating sugary 
snacks instead.  
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Rhetoric and ritual 
Policy, explanation and research are all linked, and the three relationships play a role. First, 
there is a mutually beneficial relationship between researchers and policy-makers that can have an 
adverse impact on research findings. Policy-makers value scientific research findings as a basis 
for policy because the public trust scientists more than politicians to tell them the ‘truth’ about 
whether a given policy is a good idea or not (Ipsos MORI, 2016). Researchers in turn welcome the 
opportunities from government-funded research. But rhetoric, particularly in politics, is weakened 
by any indication of uncertainty, and the caveats that form part of many scientific publications are 
omitted wholesale at the policy stage.  
Secondly, researchers do not always take control of explanatory inferences, which leaves this 
task open to others after the fact. In the absence of local, recent, relevant evidence, policy-makers 
can place the burden of proof either on the proposed change (because its effects are not well 
known) or the status quo (because it is generally agreed to be imperfect); both are logically sound. 
This makes the relationship between research and explanation a crucial one, and as explained 
above, simple statistical inference falls short of explanation in complex systems.  
The third relationship, between explanation and policy, is contested as both the researcher 
and the policymaker can offer explanations, and these can reflect biases and interests. Seeking a 
better explanation by more detailed study is time-consuming and expensive, making it unappealing 
to the funders as well. 
Policy decisions affecting public health are often binary (in our example, the tax is either 
charged or not). However, the mechanisms by which the tax affects behaviour are far from binary, 
and research needs to provide understanding of these mechanisms, not just an average. 
Researchers will have to explain that it is unrealistic in a complex system to expect an effect 
invariant over time, space, individual circumstances or other contexts, and so understanding a 
variety of mechanisms by which change comes about is more important than attributing a single 
number to it. With this insight to hand, the policy maker can still reduce the statistics to an average 
effect, but will now be aware of whether this might in fact have an unexpected disadvantage in 
some settings. 
 
Our tentative solutions 
We contend that explanations of why particular transient patterns have occurred are vitally 
important. A similar set of circumstances may recur in the future, with the system responding in a 
similar way, and this is impossible to identify from reduced-scope, simplified or strong-assumption 
analyses. If the role of the analysis is in some way to predict the future status of the system, then 
both detailed quantitative and qualitative descriptions will be needed. For this reason, we regard 
mixed-methods research as essential for complex systems. Why make strong assumptions about 
the relationships among the agents when you could simply ask them? Conversely, why simply 
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record what they tell you (and trust them) when you could also make objective measurements of 
the effects? Only by combining the two can statistical and explanatory inference be brought 
together in studying complex systems. The explanatory inference may help to identify recurring 
circumstances in the future, or it may not, but it has a better chance of useful predictive ability than 
the abstracted statistical inference alone. 
Attempting to systematise the role of explanation alongside statistical and qualitative 
inferences is a considerable challenge. If practical approaches can limit the scope for cryptic 
multiplicity, they can then be extended to the opaque one-to-many mapping of statistical inference 
onto explanations. Leamer made suggestions including ‘fragility analysis’, which is related to Platt’s 
‘strong inference’: to set out a pre-specified plan to analyse your data on the basis of your 
explanations, and then also those of people with opposing prior beliefs. If the conclusions are 
unchanged by this, they are not fragile (Leamer, 1983; Platt, 1964). Leamer, Gigerenzer and 
Manski, each writing at the interface between research and policy, have all urged researchers to 
make more thorough pre-specified plans, including how one would respond to particular patterns in 
the data by cleaning, checking, introducing more detailed models or investigating subgroups 
(Gigerenzer, 2002; Leamer, 1983; Manski, 2013).  
This would help but would be burdensome and difficult. Nevertheless, we are optimistic, 
because clinical trials now routinely use registration, oversight and pre-specification. The Medical 
Research Council in the United Kingdom has published advice on evaluating complex 
interventions, which is relevant to the problems we are considering here, although we believe that 
this guidance needs to go further, requiring detailed pre-specification and be backed by monitoring 
of the details of analysis (Moore et al., 2015). As Platt pointed out, the most effective scientific 
discovery seems to proceed by a series of focussed deductive experiments in an iterative, 
inductive process (Platt, 1964). The pre-specification of explanations is not possible over the 
longer inductive process but applies to the deduction. 
Perhaps all research in complex systems requires a data monitoring committee, such as 
clinical trials have, which considers not only the conduct of - and possibility of halting - the data 
collection, but also the conduct of - and possibility of halting - the analysis. How then can this be 
extended to explanation? Lipton characterised a good explanation as both likely (matches all 
relevant data) and lovely (provides new insight into why something happened, especially if 
phenomena outside the study are also explained) (Lipton, 2004). One way of avoiding cryptic 
multiplicity might be for researchers to pre-specify what they might regard as likely and lovely 
explanations within a given range of results.  Lipton goes further and suggests that Bayesian 
analysis could explicitly incorporate prior probability distributions representing likelihood and 
loveliness, which is intriguing but requires methodological development (Lipton, 2004).  
Education and training will be vital in improving the understanding of inference. The American 
Statistical Association’s Guidelines on Assessment and Instruction in Statistics Education provide 
a framework that we believe would help many researchers to achieve a deep understanding of 
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what they do beyond a ‘cookbook’ of statistical recipes that deliver incredible certitude (Aliaga et 
al., 2010). This is especially important for those taking courses such as Masters of Public Health, 
where study design and statistics is necessarily a relatively small part of the course and the 
cookbook is a tempting way to cover standard topics quickly. 
Recent reviews of research using complexity theory have criticised the lack of mathematical 
models. We are wary of deterministic mathematical models reintroducing old statistical problems, 
but microsimulation, also called agent-based modelling, a technique from economics, offers a very 
flexible framework that could help with understanding and explaining patterns in complex systems 
(Greenwood-Lee et al., 2016; Thompson et al., 2016). 
Realist evaluation is a valuable framework on which to build more effective research in 
complex systems (Pawson, 2013), particularly in the sense that learning about the system is an 
ongoing effort and may require adaptive interventions with ongoing evaluation (Manski, 2013). We 
do not believe that this precludes positivism or need usher in self-perpetuating research high on 
buzzwords and low on content, as some have critiqued (Cilliers, 2005; Thompson et al., 2016). 
Normalisation process theory is a similar recent effort, more focused on health systems (Murray et 
al., 2010).  
 
The near future, revisited 
In our imaginary scenario, two years have passed since the sugar tax 
was rolled out nationwide. A new assessment by different researchers has 
criticised the earlier study: some locations show bigger reductions than others, 
there is some evidence of effect modification by socio-economic class, along 
with a shift to other sources of high-sugar drinks, and the original results may 
have been biased by creating unintended incentives on the school nurses and 
supermarket managers. Because these pieces of research were conducted 
with different designs and populations, nobody can judge between them, and 
because the tax is a fait accompli, there is no appetite to fund further research. 
It could have been different. Imagine our hypothetical researchers 
beginning by seeking explanation and not just a statistical contrast. 
Recognising the sugar tax as a complex intervention, their project is planned 
using recent concepts of evaluation (Bonell, Fletcher, Morton, Lorenc, & 
Moore, 2012; Craig et al., 2008; Green et al., 2015; Murray et al., 2010). 
A mixed methods project asks shopkeepers, wholesalers, schools, health 
professionals and the public about how they regard the tax as functioning. 
Explanations for local contextual effects are sought, and the researchers 
control the message by refusing to provide a statistical interim report but 
rather a qualitative one, with detailed mixed methods reports to follow. The 
politicians like the idea of individuals’ stories followed by statistics.  
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The researchers warn that there are likely to be changes over time, as 
consumers and businesses adjust to the tax, so a snapshot could result in 
embarrassment later. They also list a number of ways in which a single effect 
might not apply across the country, or in other contexts like work or school 
canteens, and online bulk sales. They anticipate the food industry adapting 
with products that fall outside the definitions in the new law. They plan a priori 
subgroup analyses with linked interviews to look for sugary drinks becoming 
paradoxically popular, for example as a macho status symbol among teenage 
boys.  
The researchers negotiate to obtain excise data to augment that from 
retailers and households. They expect response bias to the latter and include 
this in a Bayesian analysis. They also argue for the tax to be phased in at 
different rates, so that a dose-response relationship can be studied. Finally, 
they demand that interpretation is not done behind closed doors. They could 
plan for these problems because they were suggested from an initial round-
table discussion to explore possible explanations.  
This ending to our hypothetical scenario is deliberately optimistic but reflects how some of our 
suggestions could be implemented. 
 
Conclusion 
We have reviewed some diverse opinions on the shortcomings of research under two 
difficulties: examining complex systems and making an explanatory inference rather than just a 
statistical one. We contend that this double difficulty has contributed to the so-called crisis of 
replication critiqued first in psychology and social science but now more widely. Although much 
has been written about these individual difficulties, and some solutions proposed, here we bring 
together inference to the best explanation and the gap between statistical and explanatory 
inferences, to show how this manifests in cryptic multiplicity and the crisis of replication, particularly 
in complex, adaptive systems. 
It is possible to carry out research in a complex, adaptive system in a principled way, 
influencing policy appropriately and providing reliable predictions. Much of the literature our 
argument is based on is already known to public health experts but does not seem to be regularly 
used. Moreover, there is a danger that explanatory inference, particularly if it is associated with the 
qualitative part of a mixed methods study, continues to perform ‘a largely auxiliary role in pursuit of 
the technocratic aim of accumulating knowledge of “what works”’ (Howe, 2004, p.53, as cited in 
Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p.7). Addressing this issue is far harder work than just requiring a theory 
of change to accompany a headline statistical contrast, when it is the latter that attracts the 
attention of policymakers and promotes the uncritical progression from ‘pilot’ to ‘roll-out’ of a public 
 12 
health initiative. Much methodological work is yet needed before the integration of statistical and 
explanatory inference reaches maturity. 
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